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Abstract
In the spirit of Smale’s work, we consider a pure exchange economy with general
consumption sets. We consider the case in which the consumption set of each house-
hold is described in terms of an inequality on a function called possibility function.
The possibility function represents the restricted consumption possibility on com-
modity markets. The main innovation comes from the dependency of the possibility
function with respect to the individual initial endowment. We prove that, generi-
cally, equilibria are finite and they locally depend on the initial endowments in a
smooth manner.
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1 Introduction
The objective of the paper is to generalize a result of the Debreu (1970) type
to exchange economies with general consumption sets. As in Smale (1974.b),
the consumption sets are described by possibility functions (see also del Mer-
cato, 2004). We consider the case where the possibility functions depend on
individual initial endowments.
Under generic conditions, equilibria are finite and they locally depend on “fun-
damental” parameters of the economy in a smooth manner for rather general
consumption sets, replacing the usual positive orthant as commodity space. 3
In Smale (1974.b), the consumption sets are described in terms of functions,
this idea is usual in the global approach of equilibrium analysis for production
economies. We call possibility function a function describing a consumption
set. Indeed, in Debreu (1959), each household has to choose a consumption in
his consumption set defined as the set of all possible consumptions for him.
The possibility function represents the restricted consumption possibility on
commodity markets. Many different authors have considered restrictions on
the markets, Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990), Polemarchakis and Siconolfi
(1997), Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001). But, the difference with our
approach is that in these papers the restriction is on portfolio markets but not
on commodity markets.
Our analysis encompasses the case in which the possibility function of each
household depends on his initial endowment. Indeed, if one considers the indi-
vidual initial endowment as an indicator of social class, it affects our consump-
tion possibility (but not necessarily our preferences). Our social status clearly
affects our knowledge and our information on the existence of some available
goods. Since the possibility function represents the restricted consumption
possibility on commodity markets, it is natural to assume the dependency on
the individual initial endowment. For example, the accessibility to the com-
modity markets is a measure of the development degree of a country which
clearly depends on its resources.
Moreover, as Mas-Colell and Smale have pointed out (see Smale, 1974.b), the
case in which the consumption set of each household depends on his initial
endowment becomes important when consumptions are on the boundary of
the consumption sets,
3 For other works where households do not necessarily consume every positive quan-
tity of every commodity, see Smale (1974.a), Villanacci (1993), and Bonnisseau and
Rivera (2003).
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“Perhaps it would make more sense to allow grater latitude for the initial
allocation in the definition of economy.”
A simple example of consumption constraint depending on the individual ini-
tial endowment arises when there is no purchase in good 1 for household h.
If x1h denotes the consumption of good 1 of household h, and e
1
h denotes the
endowment of good 1 owned by household h, then the consumption set of
household h is determined by the following constraint
x1h ≤ e1h (1)
In this paper, we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of
households. Each household is characterized by an initial endowment of com-
modities, a possibility function and a utility function. The possibility function
of each household depends on his initial endowment.
Taking prices and initial endowment as given, each household maximizes his
utility function in his consumption set under his budget constraint. The defi-
nition of competitive equilibrium is the natural one.
Most related to our model, del Mercato (2004) proved the existence of equi-
libria for a pure exchange economy in which the possibility function of each
household depends on his initial endowment and on the consumption choices
of others.
The main contribution of the paper is that, generically, the economies are
regular. As in Debreu (1970), Smale (1974.a, 1974.b), and Mas-Colell (1985),
equilibria are generically finite and they locally depend on “fundamental”
parameters of the economy in a smooth manner. To prove this result we follow
the strategy laid out by Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), and Villanacci
et al. (2002).
To get existence of equilibria, in Assumptions 1 and 2, we take back the
assumptions made by del Mercato (2004).
The regularity result holds when, at equilibrium, all agents are in the interior
of their consumption sets, which is always true in the already studied case
without possibility functions.
Since nothing prevents the equilibrium allocations to be on the boundary
of the consumption sets, the proof of the generic regularity result becomes
rather technical and difficult. Before, it shall be show that, generically, the
equilibrium function is differentiable at each equilibrium allocation.
We want to encompass the case analyzed by Smale (1974.b) in which the pos-
sibility function does not depend on initial endowment, and the case in which
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it depends only on the net trade. 4 Then, we posit two abstract assumptions,
namely Assumptions 12 and 14. It is easily shown that Assumption 12 covers
the two situations mentioned above. Assumption 14 covers the second one
when, at equilibrium, all consumption constraints are binding and all possi-
bility functions depend on initial endowments.
In the very particular case in which, at equilibrium, all consumption con-
straints are binding, all possibility functions depend on initial endowments,
and at most one agent does not have a possibility function depending on the
net trade, Assumption 15 is needed. Observe that this assumption is in the
same spirit of the Smale Assumption (see Remark 6). Actually, Assumption
15 deals with the case in which the allocation of a consumer does not satisfy
strict complementarity. From Remark 16, we can deduce that Assumption 15
means that, at equilibrium, there exists a bilateral costless transfer on endow-
ments such that the allocations lie in the interior of the consumption sets after
transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic elements
of our model. In Section 3, the concept of competitive equilibrium is further
analyzed. We characterize equilibria in terms of equilibrium function, using
first order conditions for household’s maximization problem. Then, we present
Theorem 9 which states the non-emptiness and compactness of the equilib-
rium set. In Section 4, we state the definition of regular economy and the main
result of the paper, Theorem 17, which states that, generically in the initial
endowments space, the economies are regular. In Subsection 4.1, first we give
the definition of border line case (i.e., a situation in which, at equilibrium,
a consumption is on the boundary of the consumption set and the associ-
ated Lagrange multiplier vanishes). Second, Proposition 21 establishes that,
generically in the initial endowments space, border line cases do not occur. In
Subsection 4.2, the strategy of the proof for Theorem 17 is detailed. Especially
as a first step, we deduce from Proposition 21 that the equilibrium function
is generically differentiable at each equilibrium allocation. All the proofs are
gathered in Appendix.
2 The model and the assumptions
There are C < ∞ physical commodities or goods. Good c is denoted by
superscript c. The commodity space is RC++. There are H <∞ households or
consumers labeled by subscript h ∈ H := {1, ..., H}. Each household h ∈ H is
characterized by an initial endowment of goods, a consumption set described
4 Observe that (1) is a simple example of consumption constraint depending on the
net trade.
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by a possibility function, and preferences described by a utility function. The
possibility function of household h depends on his initial endowment.
The notations are summarized below.
• xch is the consumption of commodity c by household h;
xh := (x
1
h, .., x
c
h, .., x
C
h ); x := (xh)h∈H ∈ RCH++ .
• ech is the endowment of commodity c owned by household h;
eh := (e
1
h, .., e
c
h, .., e
C
h ) ∈ RC++ ; e := (eh)h∈H ∈ RCH++ .
• As in general equilibrium model a` la Arrow–Debreu, each household h ∈ H
has to choose a consumption in his consumption set, i.e. in the set of all
possible consumption plans for him. In our paper, the consumption set of
household h is described in terms of a function χh. Hence we call χh pos-
sibility function. Moreover, the possibility function of household h depends
on his initial endowment. That is, given eh ∈ RC++, the consumption set of
the household h is the following set,
Xh(eh) =
{
xh ∈ RC++ : χh(xh, eh) ≥ 0
}
where χh is a function from RC++ × RC++ to R called possibility function of
household h.
• Each household h ∈ H has preferences described by a utility function uh
from RC++ to R, and uh(xh) ∈ R is the utility of household h associated with
the consumption xh ∈ RC++.
• E := (eh, χh, uh)h∈H is an economy.
• pc is the price of one unit of commodity c; p := (p1, .., pc, .., pC) ∈ RC++.
• Given w = (w1, .., wc, .., wC) ∈ RC , we denote
w\ := (w1, .., wc, .., wC−1) ∈ RC−1
We make the following assumptions on (χh, uh)h∈H. The assumptions on the
utility functions are quite standard in “smooth” general equilibrium models.
The most interesting innovation leads in the additional assumptions on the
possibility functions, since nothing prevents the equilibrium allocations to be
on the boundary of the consumption sets. 5
Assumption 1 For all h ∈ H,
(1) uh is a C
2 function,
(2) uh is differentiably strictly increasing, i.e.
∀x′h ∈ RC++, Dxhuh(x′h) 0
5 Observe that to get the existence and compactness results stated in Theorem
9, del Mercato (2004) requires each utility function to be C1, and each possibility
function to be C1 with respect to the individual consumption. We need C2 utility
and possibility functions in Section 4.
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(3) uh is differentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e.
∀y ∈ RC\{0} and ∀x′h ∈ RC++ s.t.
Dxhuh(x
′
h)y = 0, we have y
TD2xhuh(x
′
h)y < 0, and
(4) for each u ∈ Imuh, clRC{xh ∈ RC++ : uh(xh) ≥ u} ⊆ RC++.
Assumption 2 For all h ∈ H,
(1) the function χh is a C
2 function,
(2) (Convexity of the consumption set) for each eh ∈ RC++, the function
χh(·, eh) is quasi-concave, 6
(3) (Non-empty intersection with the budget set) for each eh ∈ RC++, there
exists x˜h ∈ RC++ such that χh(x˜h, eh) > 0 and x˜h  eh,
(4) (Non-satiation) for each eh ∈ RC++, x′h ∈ RC++ and χh(x′h, eh) = 0 imply
a) Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) 6= 0, and
b) Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) 6∈ −RC++
(5) (Global desirability) (x′, e) ∈ RCH++ × RCH++ and χh(x′h, eh) = 0 for every
h ∈ H, imply
∀ c ∈ {1, ..., C}, ∃ h(c) ∈ H s.t. Dxc
h(c)
χh(c)(x
′
h(c), eh(c)) ≥ 0
Since χh is C
1 and quasi-concave (see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2), as a conse-
quence of Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4 we get the following proposition. It will
play a fundamental role in the result of generic regularity (in particular see
the proof of Lemmas 20 and 23). In the following section, we just observe that,
at optimum, Proposition 3 implies that an analogous condition to the Smale
Assumption holds (see Remark 6).
Proposition 3 Let (x′h, eh, p) ∈ RC++ × RC++ × RC++, such that
χh(x
′
h, eh) = 0 and p(x
′
h − eh) = 0
Then, p and Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) are linearly independent.
6 Since χh is C2, we have that for each y ∈ RC and for each x′h ∈ RC++ such that
Dxhχh(x
′
h)y = 0, we have yD
2
xh
χh(x′h, eh)y
T ≤ 0.
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3 Competitive equilibria
The purpose of this section is to adapt to the previous model the standard
competitive equilibrium concept usually defined for a pure exchange economy.
First, we give the household h’s maximization problem, market clearing con-
ditions and the definition of competitive equilibrium. Then, we characterize
the solution of household h’s maximization problem in terms of first order
necessary and sufficient conditions (see Proposition 5). Therefore, we restate
equilibria in terms of solutions of equations (see Remark 8), from which we de-
duce the equilibrium function F (see (5)). Finally, we have the theorem stating
the non-emptiness and the compactness of the equilibrium set (see Theorem
9).
Without loss of generality, we choose commodity C as the numeraire good.
Then, given p\ ∈ RC−1++ with innocuous abuse of notation we denote
p := (p\, 1) ∈ RC++
Household h’s maximization problem is defined as follows. For any given E
and p\ ∈ RC−1++ ,
maxxh∈RC++ uh(xh)
s.t.
χh(xh, eh) ≥ 0
−p(xh − eh) ≥ 0
(2)
We say that x = (xh)h∈H satisfies market clearing conditions if∑
h∈H
xh =
∑
h∈H
eh (3)
That is, if the aggregate consumption is equal to the total resources associated
with e.
Definition 4 (x, p\) ∈ RCH++ × RC−1++ is a competitive equilibrium for E if
• for all h ∈ H, xh solves problem (2) at p\, and
• x satisfies market clearing conditions (3).
Proposition 5 For each economy E and p\ ∈ RC−1++ , a solution to problem
(2) exists and is unique. xh is the solution to problem (2) if and only if there
exists (λh, µh) ∈ R++ × R such that (xh, λh, µh) is the unique solution to the
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following system at p\.
(h.1) Dxhuh(xh)− λhp+ µhDxhχh(xh, eh) = 0
(h.2) −p(xh − eh) = 0
(h.3) min {µh, χh(xh, eh)} = 0
(4)
Proposition 5 is a particular case of results obtained by del Mercato (2004).
Then, we omit the proofs.
In the following remark we just observe that at optimum an analogous condi-
tion to the Smale Assumption holds (see NCP Hypothesis, Smale, 1974.b).
Remark 6 For a given economy E and p\ ∈ RC−1++ , let be xh the solution to
problem (2). From Propositions 3 and 5, and Assumptions 1.2 and 2.4, the
following property holds.
(Smale’s Assumption) χh(xh, eh) = 0 implies that Dxhuh(xh) and Dxhχh(xh, eh)
are linearly independent.
Remark 7 From now on, we take for fixed (χh, uh)h∈H. Then, an economy is
completely described by an element e = (eh)h∈H ∈ RCH++ .
Define the set of endogenous variables as Ξ :=
(
RC++ × R++ × R
)H × RC−1++ ,
with generic element ξ := (x, λ, µ, p\) := ((xh, λh, µh)h∈H, p\). We can now de-
scribe extended equilibria using the system of Kuhn-Tucker conditions (4) and
market clearing conditions (3). Observe that, from Definition 4 and Proposi-
tion 5, the market clearing condition for good C is “redundant” (see equations
(h.2)h∈H in (4)). Therefore, in the following remark we omit in (3) the condi-
tion for good C.
Remark 8 ξ = (x, λ, µ, p\) ∈ Ξ is an extended competitive equilibrium for
e ∈ RCH++ if and only if
• for all h ∈ H, (xh, λh, µh) solves system (4) at p\, and
• x satisfies the following market clearing conditions,
∑
h∈H
(x
\
h − e\h) = 0
Define the following equilibrium function F : Ξ× RCH++ → RdimΞ,
F (ξ, e) :=
((
F (h.1) (ξ, e) , F (h.2) (ξ, e) , F (h.3) (ξ, e)
)
h∈H , F
(M) (ξ, e)
)
(5)
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where for each h ∈ H,
F (h.1) (ξ, e) := Dxhuh(xh)− λhp+ µhDxhχh(xh, eh)
F (h.2) (ξ, e) := −p(xh − eh)
F (h.3) (ξ, e) := min {µh, χh(xh, eh)}
and
F (M) (ξ, e) :=
∑
h∈H
(x
\
h − e\h)
Moreover, define the following function
Fe : ξ ∈ Ξ→ Fe(ξ) := F (ξ, e) ∈ RdimΞ
Therefore, from Remark 8 and the above definitions, we have that ξ ∈ Ξ is an
extended equilibrium for e ∈ RCH++ if and only if F (ξ, e) = Fe (ξ) = 0. With
innocuous abuse of terminology, we will call ξ simply an equilibrium.
The following theorem states the non-emptiness and the compactness of the
equilibrium set. Theorem 9 is a particular case of the existence and compact-
ness results obtained by del Mercato (2004). Then, we omit the proof.
Theorem 9 For each e ∈ RCH++ , the set F−1e (0) it is not empty and it is
compact.
4 Regular economies
As in Debreu (1970), Smale (1974.a, 1974.b), and Mas-Colell (1985), we show
that, generically, equilibria are finite and they locally depend on exogenous
variables in a smooth manner. To prove this result we follow the strategy laid
out by Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), and Villanacci et al. (2002).
Observe that for each h ∈ H the function
F (h.3)(ξ, e) = min {µh, χh(xh, eh)}
is not everywhere differentiable. We have to take in account this feature in the
definition of regular economy.
Definition 10 e ∈ RCH++ is a regular economy if
(1) for each ξ∗ ∈ F−1e (0), Fe is differentiable in ξ∗, and
(2) 0 is a regular value for Fe, which means that for each ξ
∗ ∈ F−1e (0),
DξFe(ξ
∗) is onto.
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From Theorem 9, Corollary 26 in the Appendix, and the implicit function
theorem for boundaryless manifolds, we get the following properties of regular
economies.
Proposition 11 If e ∈ RCH++ is a regular economy, then
(1) F−1e (0) is a finite set;
(2) for each ξ∗ ∈ F−1e (0), DξFe(ξ∗) is onto;
(3) for each ξ∗ ∈ F−1e (0), there exists an open set U ⊆ RCH++ , an open set
V ⊆ RdimΞ and a unique function g : U → V such that (ξ∗, e) ∈ V × U ,
g is C1, g(e) = ξ∗ and for every e′ ∈ U , F (g(e′) , e′) = 0.
The already known results without possibility functions shows that the differ-
entiability and regularity results hold when, at equilibrium, all agents are in
the interior of their consumption sets. But, since nothing prevents the equi-
librium allocations to be on the boundary of the consumption sets, from now
on, we make additional assumptions on (χh, uh)h∈H. We want to encompass
the case analyzed by Smale (1974.b) in which the possibility function does not
depend on initial endowment, and the case in which it depends only on the
net trade. Then, we posit two abstract assumptions, namely Assumptions 12
and 14.
Assumption 12 For all h ∈ H, (x∗h, e∗h) ∈ RC++ × RC++ and χh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
imply that there exist an open neighborhood N∗ of (x∗h, e
∗
h) in RC++ ×RC++ and
γ∗h ∈ R such that
Dehχh(x
′
h, e
′
h) = γ
∗
hDxhχh(x
′
h, e
′
h), ∀ (x′h, e′h) ∈ N∗
As consequence of Assumption 12, we get
D2xhehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = γ
∗
hD
2
xh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) (6)
Remark 13 Observe that
• if the possibility function χh does not depend on the individual initial en-
dowment, then Assumption 12 is satisfied with γ∗h = 0;
• if the possibility function χh depends on the net trade, i.e. χh(xh, eh) :=
χ˜h(xh−eh) where χ˜h : RC → R is a differentiable function, then Assumption
12 is satisfied with γ∗h = −1.
From now on, γ∗h is the real number obtained by Assumption 12.
Assumption 14 Let (x∗, e∗) ∈ RCH++×RCH++ such that χh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0 for every
h ∈ H. If γ∗h 6= 0 for each h ∈ H, then γ∗h ≥ −1 for each h ∈ H.
When, at equilibrium, all agents are on the boundary of their consumption sets
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and all possibility functions depend on initial endowments, one easily checks
that Assumption 14 holds true if χh depends only on the net trade.
In the very particular case in which, at equilibrium, all consumption con-
straints are binding, all possibility functions depend on initial endowments,
and at most one agent does not have a possibility function depending on the
net trade, Assumption 15 is needed. Observe that this assumption is in the
same spirit of the Smale Assumption (see Remark 6). Actually, Assumption
15 deals with the case in which the allocation of a consumer does not satisfy
strict complementarity.
Assumption 15 H ≥ 2 and C > 2. Let (x∗, e∗) ∈ RCH++ × RCH++ such that
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = 0 for every h ∈ H. If
(1) γ∗h 6= 0 for each h ∈ H, and
(2) there exists h˜ ∈ H, such that γ∗h = −1 for each h 6= h˜,
then, there exist k and k˜ in H, k 6= k˜, such that
Dxkuk(x
∗
k), Dxkχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) and Dx
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
are linearly independent.
Remark 16 H ≥ 2 and C > 2. Let (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1(0) such that χh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
for every h ∈ H. If
(1) γ∗h 6= 0 for each h ∈ H, and
(2) there exists h˜ ∈ H, such that γ∗h = −1 for each h 6= h˜,
then, Assumptions 12 and 15 imply that there exist k and k˜ in H, k 6= k˜, such
that
p∗, Dekχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) and De
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
are linearly independent.
Note that in Remark 16, differently from Assumption 15, the price is involved
as well as the derivative with respect to the initial endowments. Then, we can
deduce that Assumption 15 means that, at equilibrium, there exists a bilateral
costless transfer on endowments such that the allocations lie in the interior of
the consumption sets after transfers.
From now on, Assumptions 1, 2, 12, 14, and 15 hold true. The main result of
this section is the following theorem which states the result of generic regu-
larity.
Theorem 17 The set R of regular economies is an open and full measure
subset of RCH++ .
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In Subsection 4.1, first we state the definition of border line case. Second,
Proposition 21 establishes that border line cases occur outside an open and
full measure subset E of the space RCH++ . The proof of Proposition 21 is built
upon Lemmas 19 and 20. In Subsection 4.2, the strategy of the proof for
Theorem 17 is detailed. Especially as a first step, we deduce from Proposition
21 that F is differentiable in F−1(0) ∩ (Ξ × E). Then, we show Theorem 17
using Lemma 23 and Proposition 24.
4.1 Border line cases
First, we give the definition of border line case.
Definition 18 Given (ξ, e) ∈ F−1(0), household h is at a border line case if
µh = χh(xh, eh) = 0
The main result of this subsection is Proposition 21 stating that border line
cases occur outside an open and full measure subset E of the space RCH++ . To
construct the set E and to prove that E is open and full measure subset of
RCH++ we need to introduce some preliminary definitions and lemmas.
Define
Bh :=
{
(ξ, e) ∈ F−1(0) : µh = χh(xh, eh) = 0
}
and B :=
⋃
h∈H
Bh
Observe that Bh is closed in F
−1(0) for each h ∈ H, therefore B is closed in
F−1(0). Define also the restriction to F−1(0) of the projection of Ξ×RCH++ onto
RCH++ ,
Φ : (ξ, e) ∈ F−1(0) −→ Φ(ξ, e) := e ∈ RCH++
and
E := RCH++ \ Φ(B)
Observe that, by definition, for each (ξ, e) ∈ F−1(0) ∩ (Ξ × E) and for each
h ∈ H, either
µh > 0 or χh(xh, eh) > 0
We have to prove that Φ(B) is closed and of measure zero in RCH++ .
The closedness of Φ(B) follows from the closedness of B in F−1(0) and the
properness of Φ obtained by the following lemma.
Lemma 19 The function Φ is proper.
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To show that Φ(B) is of measure zero, define
P :=
J = {H1,H2,H3} Hi ⊆ H, ∀i = 1, 2, 3;H1 ∪H2 ∪H3 = H;Hi ∩Hj = ∅, ∀i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j; and H3 6= ∅

Let J = {H1,H2,H3} ∈ P , for each i = 1, 2, 3 denote by Hi(J ) the set Hi in
J , and by |Hi(J )| the number of element of Hi(J ). We define
ΞJ := R(C+1)H++ ×
(
R|H1(J )|+|H3(J )| × R|H2(J )|++
)
× R(C−1)++ (7)
Observe that dimΞJ = dimΞ. Let the function
FJ : ΞJ × RCH++ → RdimΞJ
FJ (ξ, e) :=
((
F (h.1) (ξ, e) , F (h.2) (ξ, e) , F
(h.3)
J (ξ, e)
)
h∈H , F
(M) (ξ, e)
)
where FJ differs from F defined in (5), for the domain and for the component
F
(h.3)
J defined below
F
(h.3)
J (ξ, e) :=
µh if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪H3(J ),χh(xh, eh) if h ∈ H2(J )
Moreover, given J ∈ P define the set
EJ := {(ξ, e) ∈ F−1J (0) : χh(xh, eh) = 0, ∀h ∈ H3(J )}
Given an arbitrary (ξ, e) ∈ B, we can define endogenously
J (ξ, e) := {H1(ξ, e),H2(ξ, e),H3(ξ, e)} ∈ P
where
H1(ξ, e) := {h ∈ H : µh = 0 and χh(xh, eh) > 0}
H2(ξ, e) := {h ∈ H : µh > 0 and χh(xh, eh) = 0}
H3(ξ, e) := {h ∈ H : µh = χh(xh, eh) = 0}
Therefore (ξ, e) ∈ EJ (ξ,e), and then we get
Φ(B) ⊆ ⋃
J∈P
Φ(EJ ) (8)
Since the number of sets involved in the above union in finite, to show that
Φ(B) is of measure zero it is enough to show that Φ(EJ ) is of measure zero,
for each J ∈ P . To show that Φ(EJ ) is of measure zero for each J ∈ P , we
need the following definitions and the following key lemma.
14
Given J ∈ P, for each h ∈ H3(J ) define the function
FJ ,h : ΞJ × RCH++ → RdimΞJ+1
FJ ,h (ξ, e) :=
(
FJ (ξ, e) , F
(h.4)
J (ξ, e)
)
, where F
(h.4)
J (ξ, e) := χh(xh, eh)
Moreover, for each e ∈ RCH++ , define the following function
FJ ,h,e : ξ ∈ ΞJ −→ FJ ,h,e(ξ) := FJ ,h(ξ, e) ∈ RdimΞJ+1
The above definition allows us to conclude that, for each J ∈ P , for each
h ∈ H3(J ) and for each e ∈ RCH++ , FJ ,h and FJ ,h,e are differentiable on all
their domain.
Lemma 20 For each J ∈ P and for each h ∈ H3(J ), 0 is a regular value
for FJ ,h.
Then, from results of differential topology (see Theorems 25 and 27 in Ap-
pendix), given J ∈ P, for each h ∈ H3(J ) there exists a full measure subset
ΩJ ,h of RCH++ such that for each e ∈ ΩJ ,h, F−1J ,h,e(0) = ∅. Given J ∈ P, let
ΩJ :=
⋃
h∈H3(J )
ΩJ ,h
ΩJ is a full measure subset of RCH++ , and we have
ΩJ ⊆ RCH++ \ Φ(EJ )
Indeed, let e ∈ ΩJ , by definition we have that there exists h ∈ H3(J ) such that
F−1J ,h,e(0) = ∅. If e ∈ Φ(EJ ), then there exists ξ ∈ ΞJ such that ξ ∈ F−1J ,h,e(0)
for each h ∈ H3(J ), and we get a contradiction.
Therefore,
Φ(EJ ) ⊆ RCH++ \ ΩJ
Since RCH++ \ ΩJ is of measure zero, Φ(EJ ) is of measure zero as well. Then,
Φ(B) is of measure zero (see (8)).
Therefore, from Lemmas 19 and 20 it follows the following proposition.
Proposition 21 There exists an open and full measure subset E of RCH++ such
that for each (ξ, e) ∈ F−1(0) ∩ (Ξ× E) and for each h ∈ H, either
µh > 0 or χh(xh, eh) > 0
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4.2 Generic regularity
In this subsection we prove that Theorem 17 holds.
From now on, the set E is the open and full measure subset of RCH++ obtained
in Proposition 21. Observe that F is differentiable in F−1(0)∩(Ξ×E). Indeed,
given (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1(0) ∩ (Ξ× E), define
H1(ξ∗, e∗) := H∗1 := {h ∈ H : µ∗h = 0 and χh(x∗h, e∗h) > 0}
H2(ξ∗, e∗) := H∗2 := {h ∈ H : µ∗h > 0 and χh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0}
(9)
By Proposition 21, it follows that
H∗1 ∪H∗2 = H and H∗1 ∩H∗2 = ∅
Since the linear functions and the possibility functions are continuous, there
exists an open neighborhood I∗ of (ξ∗, e∗) in Ξ×E such that for each (ξ, e) ∈
I∗,
F (h.3) (ξ, e) =
µh if h ∈ H
∗
1
χh(xh, eh) if h ∈ H∗2
Remark 22 From now on, the domain of F will be Ξ×E instead of Ξ×RCH++ .
The main result of this subsection is Proposition 24. To prove Proposition
24, we need the following definitions and the following key lemma. Observe
that there is a slight difference between the below definitions and the defini-
tions given in Subsection 4.1. In Subsection 4.1, we considered the set P of
appropriate {H1,H2,H3} with H3 6= ∅. In this subsection, we are interested
to describe the case in which H3 = ∅. Then, we define
A := {I := {H1,H2} : Hi ⊆ H, ∀i = 1, 2;H1 ∪H2 = H and H1 ∩H2 = ∅}
Let I = {H1,H2} ∈ A, for each i = 1, 2 denote by Hi(I) the set Hi in I, and
by |Hi(I)| the number of element of Hi(I). We define
ΞI := R(C+1)H++ ×
(
R|H1(I)| × R|H2(I)|++
)
× R(C−1)++ (10)
and we observe that dimΞI = dimΞ. We also define the following function
FI : ΞI × E → RdimΞI
FI (ξ, e) :=
((
F (h.1) (ξ, e) , F (h.2) (ξ, e) , F
(h.3)
I (ξ, e)
)
h∈H , F
(M) (ξ, e)
)
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where FI differs from F defined in (5), for the domain and for the component
F
(h.3)
I defined below
F
(h.3)
I (ξ, e) :=
µh if h ∈ H1(I),χh(xh, eh) if h ∈ H2(I)
All the above definitions allows us to conclude that for each I ∈ A, FI is
differentiable on all its domain.
Lemma 23 For each I ∈ A and for each (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1I (0), D(ξ,e)FI(ξ∗, e∗)
has full row rank.
Observe that from Remark 22, for each (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1(0) we have that
• I∗ := {H∗1,H∗2} ∈ A (see 9),
• (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1I∗ (0), and
• D(ξ,e)F (ξ∗, e∗) = D(ξ,e)FI∗(ξ∗, e∗).
Then, from Lemma 23 we get the following result.
Proposition 24 H ≥ 2 and C > 2. 0 is a regular value for F .
From the above proposition and from the transversality theorem (see Theorem
27 in Appendix), there exists a full measure subset E∗ of E such that for each
e ∈ E∗, 0 is a regular value for Fe. Since E is a full measure subset of RCH++ , E∗
is a full measure subset of RCH++ . Since the set R of regular economies contains
E∗, R is a full measure subset of RCH++ . Moreover, from Lemma 19 and from
Corollary 28 in the Appendix, it follows that R is an open subset of RCH++ .
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Otherwise, suppose that Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) = βp with
β 6= 0. Since p  0 and χh(x′h, eh) = 0, we have that β > 0 (see Assumption
2.4). Therefore, Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) 0. From Assumption 2.3, x˜h ∈ RC++ satisfies
χh(x˜h, eh) > 0 and x˜h  eh (11)
Since χh is C
1 and quasi-concave (see Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2),
χh(x˜h, eh)− χh(x′h, eh) > 0
implies that
Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh)(x˜h − x′h) ≥ 0
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Then, from Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh) 0 and (11) we get
Dxhχh(x
′
h, eh)(eh − x′h) > 0
that is βp(eh − x′h) > 0, contradicting p(x′h − eh) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 19. The proof follows the same steps as the compactness
result obtained in Theorem 9.
Proof of Lemma 20. We have to show that for each (ξ∗, e∗) ∈ F−1J ,h(0),
D(ξ,e)FJ ,h (ξ
∗, e∗) has full row rank.
Let ∆ :=
(
(∆xh,∆λh,∆µh)h∈H,∆p\,∆v
)
∈ R(C+2)H ×RC−1×R. It is enough
to show that
∆ ·D(ξ,e)FJ ,h (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 =⇒ ∆ = 0
We consider two cases: Case 1. H1(J ) 6= ∅, and Case 2. H1(J ) = ∅.
Case 1. H1(J ) 6= ∅. Without loosing of generality we suppose 1 ∈ H1(J ).
The computation of the partial jacobian matrix with respect to(
(xh, λh, µh)h∈H, e1, eh, p
\)
is described below. To simplify the lecture of the matrices, we use the following
simplified notations
• D2xhuh := D2xhuh(x∗h);• Dxhχh := Dxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) and Dehχh := Dehχh(x∗h, e∗h);
• D2xhuh, χh := D2xhuh(x∗h)+µ∗hD2xhχh(x∗h, e∗h) and D2xhehχh := D2xhehχh(x∗h, e∗h).
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1
λ
1
µ
1
x
h
λ
h
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h
x
h
′
λ
h
′
µ
h
′
e 1
e h
p
\
F
(1
.1
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D
2 x
1
u
1
−p
∗T
D
x
1
χ
T 1
−λ
∗ 1[
I C
−
1
|0]
T
F
(1
.2
)
−p
∗
p
∗
−( x∗
\
1
−e
∗\ 1
)
F
(1
.3
)
J
1
F
(h
.1
)
D
2 x
h
u
h
−p
∗T
D
x
h
χ
T h
−λ
∗ h[
I C
−
1
|0]
T
F
(h
.2
)
−p
∗
p
∗
−( x∗
\
h
−e
∗\ h
)
F
(h
.3
)
J
1
F
(h
′ .1
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D
2 x
h
′u
h
′,
χ
h
′
−p
∗T
D
x
h
′χ
T h
′
−λ
∗ h′
[I
C
−
1
|0]
T
F
(h
′ .2
)
−p
∗
−( x∗
\
h
′−
e∗
\
h
′)
F
(h
′ .3
)
J
D
x
h
′χ
h
′
F
M
[I
C
−
1
|0]
[I
C
−
1
|0]
[I
C
−
1
|0]
−[
I C
−
1
|0]
−[
I C
−
1
|0]
F
(h
.4
)
J
D
x
h
χ
h
D
e
h
χ
h
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The partial system ∆ ·D(ξ,e)FJ ,h (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 is written in detail below.

∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)−∆λhp∗ +∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h})
∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) + ∆p
\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
T +∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪H3(J )
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
∆λ1p
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0
∆λhp
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h +
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
Since p∗C = 1, we get ∆λ1 = 0 and ∆p\ = 0. Therefore, the above system
becomes the following one
∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)−∆λhp∗ = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h})
∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) = 0 if h
′ ∈ H2(J )
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
T +∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪H3(J )
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
∆λhp
∗ +∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h +
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
∆λ1 = ∆p
\ = 0
(12)
From system (12), we get
∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h}) (13)
and
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = −µ∗h′∆xh′D2xh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′)∆xTh′ if h′ ∈ H2(J )
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Then, Assumption 2.2 and µ∗h′ > 0 for each h
′ ∈ H2(J ) imply that
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ ≥ 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J ) (14)
Observe that from FJ ,h(ξ
∗, e∗) = 0 and system (12), we get
Dxhuh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h = λ
∗
hp
∗∆xTh = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪H3(J )
and
Dxh′uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = λ
∗
h′p
∗∆xTh′ + µ
∗
h′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = 0 if h
′ ∈ H2(J )
(15)
Then, (13), (14) and Assumption 1.3 imply that
∆xh = 0 for each h 6= h
Therefore, the relevant equations of system (12) become

∆λhp
∗ = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h})
∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
∆λh′p
∗ −∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′) = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
∆xhp
∗T = 0
∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h})
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)T +∆µh = 0
∆λhp
∗ +∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0
λ∗
h
∆x
\
h
+
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
∆λ1 = ∆p
\ = 0
∆xh = 0 for each h 6= h
Since p∗  0, ∆λh = 0 for each h ∈ H1(J ) ∪ (H3(J ) \ {h}). Moreover,
FJ ,h(ξ
∗, e∗) = 0 and Proposition 3 imply that ∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each
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h′ ∈ H2(J ). Therefore, the above system becomes the following one

∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
∆xhp
∗T = 0
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)T +∆µh = 0
∆λhp
∗ +∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0
λ∗
h
∆x
\
h
+∆λh(x
∗\
h
− e∗\
h
) = 0
∆p\ = 0
∆xh = ∆λh = ∆µh = 0 for each h 6= h
(16)
From Assumption 12, we know that De
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = γ∗
h
Dx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) with
γ∗
h
∈ R.
If γ∗
h
= 0, since p∗  0 we get ∆λh = 0. Then, ∆xh = 0 since λh > 0 and
∆xhp
∗T = 0. Finally, ∆µh = 0, and ∆v = 0 since Dxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) 6= 0 (see
Assumption 2.4.a).
If γ∗
h
6= 0, from Proposition 3 we know that p∗ and De
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) are linearly
independent. Then, we get ∆λh = ∆v = 0, and ∆xh = 0 since λh > 0 and
∆xhp
∗T = 0. Finally, ∆µh = 0.
Therefore, ∆ = 0.
Case 2. H1(J ) = ∅. If H3(J ) \ {h} 6= ∅, without loosing of generality we
can suppose 1 ∈ H3(J ) and 1 6= h. Then, the result follows as in Case 1.
Therefore, we analyze the case in which H3(J ) = {h}.
The computation of the partial jacobian matrix with respect to
(
(xh, λh, µh, eh)h∈H, p\
)
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is described below.
x
h
λ
h
µ
h
xh′ λh′ µh′ eh eh′ p\
F (h.1) D
2
x
h
u
h
−p∗T Dx
h
χT
h
−λ∗
h
[IC−1|0]T
F (h.2) −p∗ p∗ −
(
x
∗\
h
−e∗\
h
)
F
(h.3)
J
1
F (h
′.1) D2xh′ uh′ ,χh′ −p
∗T Dxh′χ
T
h′ µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′eh′χh′ −λ∗h′ [IC−1|0]
T
F (h
′.2) −p∗ p∗ −
(
x
∗\
h′−e
∗\
h′
)
F
(h′.3)
J
Dxh′χh′ Deh′χh′
FM [IC−1|0] [IC−1|0] −[IC−1|0] −[IC−1|0]
F
(h.4)
J
Dx
h
χ
h
De
h
χ
h
The system ∆ ·D(ξ,e)FJ ,h (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 is written in detail below.

∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) + ∆p
\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)T +∆µh = 0
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
∆λhp
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0
∆xh′µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′eh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) + ∆λh′p
∗+
∆µh′Deh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)−∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
−∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h −
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
(17)
First, observe that we are in the case where, at equilibrium, all households are
on the boundary of their consumption sets. Then, from Assumptions 12 and
(6), for each h ∈ H we have that
Dehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = γ
∗
hDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) and D
2
xheh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = γ
∗
hD
2
xh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
(18)
for some γ∗h ∈ R. Now, we consider two possible sub-cases: in Case 2.1, we
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suppose that
∃ h ∈ H : γ∗h = 0
and in Case 2.2 we have that
γ∗h 6= 0, ∀h ∈ H
Case 2.1. If h = h, γ∗
h
= 0. From system (17) we get ∆λh = 0 and ∆p
\ = 0,
since p∗C = 1. Then, the relevant equations of system (17) become
∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
) + ∆vDx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) = 0 if h
′ ∈ H2(J )
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)T +∆µh = 0
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )∑
h∈H
λ∗h∆x
\
h +
∑
h 6=h
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
Since (14) and (15) hold, Assumption 1.3 implies that ∆xh′ = 0 for each
h′ 6= h. Then, Proposition 3 implies that ∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each h′ 6= h,
and we get ∆xh = 0 since λh > 0 and ∆xhp
∗T = 0. Finally, ∆µh = 0, and
∆v = 0 since Dx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) 6= 0 (see Assumption 2.4.a). That is, ∆ = 0.
If h 6= h, from (17) and (18), we get ∆λh = 0 and ∆p\ = 0, since p∗C = 1.
Then, using the above arguments, we get ∆xh′ = 0 and ∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for
each h′ 6= h. Therefore, system (17) becomes system (16), and we get ∆ = 0
using the same arguments as in Case 1.
Case 2.2. In this case, γ∗h 6= 0 for each h ∈ H. From system (17), for each
h′ 6= h we get
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′
(
D2xh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) +D
2
xh′eh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
)]
=
−∆µh′
[
Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) +Deh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
Then, from (18) we have that for each h′ 6= h
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′(1 + γ
∗
h′)D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
=
−∆µh′(1 + γ∗h′)Dxh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′)
By system (17), it follows that for each h′ 6= h
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = −µ∗h′(1 + γ∗h′)∆xh′D2xh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′)∆xTh′
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Then, Assumptions 2.2 and 14, and µ∗h′ > 0 for each h
′ 6= h, imply that
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ ≥ 0 for each h′ 6= h (19)
Since (15) holds, (19) and Assumption 1.3 imply that
∆xh′ = 0 for each h
′ 6= h
Therefore, system (17) becomes the following one.
∆xhD
2
x
h
uh(x
∗
h
)−∆λhp∗ +∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) = 0
−∆λh′p∗ +∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′) + ∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ 6= h
∆xhp
∗T = 0
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)T +∆µh = 0
∆λhp
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] + ∆vDe
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) = 0
∆λh′p
∗ +∆µh′Deh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)−∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ 6= h
λ∗
h
∆x
\
h
+
∑
h∈H
∆λh(x
∗\
h − e∗\h ) = 0
(20)
Now, we consider again two possible sub-cases: in Case 2.2.1, we suppose that
∃ (h, k) ∈ H ×H, h 6= k : γ∗h 6= −1 and γ∗k 6= −1
and in Case 2.2.2, we have that
∃ h˜ ∈ H : γ∗h = −1, ∀ h 6= h˜
Case 2.2.1. In this case, we can suppose that there exists h 6= h such that
γ∗h 6= −1. From (20) and (18), we get
0 = ∆µh [Dxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) +Dehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)] = ∆µh(1 + γ
∗
h)Dxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
Since Dxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) 6= 0 (see Assumption 2.4.a), we get ∆µh = 0. Then, from
system (20) we get ∆λh = 0 and ∆p
\ = 0, since p∗C = 1. Proposition 3 implies
that ∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each h
′ 6= h. Therefore, system (20) becomes system
(16), and we get ∆ = 0 using the same arguments as in Case 1.
Case 2.2.2. Since FJ ,h(ξ
∗, e∗) = 0, from Remark 16 there exist k and k˜ in H,
k 6= k˜, such that
p∗, Dekχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) and De
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
are linearly independent.
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If k and k˜ are in H2(J ), from system (20) we get
∆λkp
∗ +∆µkDekχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) = ∆λk˜p
∗ +∆µ
k˜
De
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
that is
(∆λk −∆λk˜)p∗ +∆µkDekχk(x∗k, e∗k)−∆µk˜Dek˜χk˜(x
∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
) = 0
which implies ∆µk = ∆µk˜ = 0 and ∆λk = ∆λk˜. Then, from system (20)
we get ∆λk = 0 and ∆p
\ = 0, since p∗C = 1. Proposition 3 implies that
∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each h
′ 6= h. Therefore, system (20) becomes system
(16), and we get ∆ = 0 using the same arguments as in Case 1.
If k = h or k˜ = h, using similar arguments, we get ∆ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 23. Let ∆ :=
(
(∆xh,∆λh,∆µh)h∈H,∆p\
)
∈ R(C+2)H ×
RC−1. It is enough to show that
∆ ·D(ξ,e)FI (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 =⇒ ∆ = 0
We consider two cases: 1. H1(I) 6= ∅, and 2. H1(I) = ∅.
Case 1. H1(I) 6= ∅. Without loosing of generality we suppose 1 ∈ H1(I).
The computation of the partial jacobian matrix with respect to
((xh, λh, µh)h∈H, e1)
is described below.
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x
1
λ
1
µ
1
x
h
λ
h
µ
h
x
h
′
λ
h
′
µ
h
′
e 1
F
(1
.1
)
D
2 x
1
u
1
−p
∗T
D
x
1
χ
T 1
F
(1
.2
)
−p
∗
p
∗
F
(1
.3
)
I
1
F
(h
.1
)
D
2 x
h
u
h
−p
∗T
D
x
h
χ
T h
F
(h
.2
)
−p
∗
F
(h
.3
)
I
1
F
(h
′ .1
)
D
2 x
h
′u
h
′,
χ
h
′
−p
∗T
D
x
h
′χ
T h
′
F
(h
′ .2
)
−p
∗
F
(h
′ .3
)
I
D
x
h
′χ
h
′
F
M
[I
C
−
1
|0]
[I
C
−
1
|0]
[I
C
−
1
|0]
−[
I C
−
1
|0]
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The partial system ∆ ·D(ξ,e)FI (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 is written in detail below.

∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)−∆λhp∗ +∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) + ∆p
\ [IC−1|0] = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(I)
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
T +∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(I)
∆λ1p
∗ −∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0
Since p∗C = 1, we get ∆λ1 = 0 and ∆p\ = 0. Therefore, the above system
becomes the following one

∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)−∆λhp∗ = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆xh′
[
D2xh′uh′(x
∗
h′) + µ
∗
h′D
2
xh′
χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
]
−∆λh′p∗+
∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′) = 0 if h
′ ∈ H2(I)
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
T +∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆xh′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)
T = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(J )
∆λ1 = ∆p
\ = 0
(21)
From system (21), we get
∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h = 0 if h ∈ H1(I) (22)
and
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = −µ∗h′∆xh′D2xh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′)∆xTh′ if h′ ∈ H2(I)
Then, Assumption 2.2 and µ∗h′ > 0 for each h
′ ∈ H2(I) imply that
∆xh′D
2
xh′
uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ ≥ 0 if h′ ∈ H2(I) (23)
Observe that from FI(ξ∗, e∗) = 0 and system (21), we get
Dxhuh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h = λ
∗
hp
∗∆xTh = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
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and
Dxh′uh′(x
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = λ
∗
h′p
∗∆xTh′ + µ
∗
h′Dxh′χh′(x
∗
h′ , e
∗
h′)∆x
T
h′ = 0 if h
′ ∈ H2(I)
(24)
Then, (22), (23) and Assumption 1.3 imply that
∆xh = 0 for each h ∈ H
Therefore, the relevant equations of system (21) become

∆λhp
∗ = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆λh′p
∗ −∆µh′Dxh′χh′(x∗h′ , e∗h′) = 0 if h′ ∈ H2(I)
∆µh = 0 if h ∈ H1(I)
∆λ1 = ∆p
\ = 0
∆xh = 0 for each h ∈ H
Since p∗  0, ∆λh = 0 for each h ∈ H1(I). Moreover, FI(ξ∗, e∗) = 0 and
Proposition 3 imply that ∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each h
′ ∈ H2(I). Therefore,
∆ = 0.
Case 2. H1(I) = ∅. Then, H2(I) = H.
The computation of the partial jacobian matrix with respect to
(xh, λh, µh, eh)h∈H
is described below.
xh λh µh eh
F (h.1) D2xh
uh,χh −p∗T DxhχTh µ∗hD2xhehχh
F (h.2) −p∗ p∗
F
(h.3)
I
Dxhχh Dehχh
FM [IC−1|0] −[IC−1|0]
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The partial system ∆ ·D(ξ,e)FI (ξ∗, e∗) = 0 is written in detail below.

∆xh
[
D2xhuh(x
∗
h) + µ
∗
hD
2
xh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
]
−∆λhp∗+
∆µhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) + ∆p
\ [IC−1|0] = 0 for each h ∈ H
−∆xhp∗T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
T = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆xhµ
∗
hD
2
xheh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) + ∆λhp
∗+
∆µhDehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)−∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 for each h ∈ H
We are in the case where, at equilibrium, all households are on the boundary
of their consumption sets. Then, from Assumptions 12 and (6), for each h ∈ H
we have that
Dehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = γ
∗
hDxhχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) and D
2
xheh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h) = γ
∗
hD
2
xh
χh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)
for some γ∗h ∈ R.
If there is h ∈ H such that γ∗h = 0, we get ∆λh = 0 and ∆p\ = 0, since
p∗C = 1. Then, (23) and (24) hold, and Assumption 1.3 implies that ∆xh′ = 0
for each h′ ∈ H. Moreover, FI(ξ∗, e∗) = 0 and Proposition 3 imply that
∆λh′ = ∆µh′ = 0 for each h
′ ∈ H. Therefore, ∆ = 0.
If γ∗h 6= 0 for each h ∈ H, since
∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h = −µ∗h(1 + γ∗h)∆xhD2xhχh(x∗h, e∗h)∆xTh for each h ∈ H
Assumptions 2.2 and 14, and µ∗h > 0 imply that
∆xhD
2
xh
uh(x
∗
h)∆x
T
h ≥ 0 for each h ∈ H
Then, (24) and Assumption 1.3 implies that ∆xh = 0 for each h ∈ H. There-
fore, the above system becomes the following one.
∆xh = 0 for each h ∈ H
−∆λhp∗ +∆µhDxhχh(x∗h, e∗h) + ∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 for each h ∈ H
∆λhp
∗ +∆µhDehχh(x
∗
h, e
∗
h)−∆p\ [IC−1|0] = 0 for each h ∈ H
(25)
If there is h ∈ H such that γ∗
h
6= −1, since
0 = ∆µh
[
Dx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) +De
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)
]
= ∆µh(1 + γ
∗
h
)Dx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
)
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and Dx
h
χh(x
∗
h
, e∗
h
) 6= 0 (see Assumption 2.4.a), we get ∆µh = 0. Then, from
system (25) we get ∆λh = 0 and ∆p
\ = 0, since p∗C = 1. Proposition 3 implies
that ∆λh = ∆µh = 0 for each h 6= h. Therefore, ∆ = 0.
If γ∗h = −1 for each h ∈ H, since FI(ξ∗, e∗) = 0, from Remark 16 there exist
k and k˜ in H, k 6= k˜, such that
p∗, Dekχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) and De
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
are linearly independent. From system (25) we get
∆λkp
∗ +∆µkDekχk(x
∗
k, e
∗
k) = ∆λk˜p
∗ +∆µ
k˜
De
k˜
χ
k˜
(x∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
)
that is
(∆λk −∆λk˜)p∗ +∆µkDekχk(x∗k, e∗k)−∆µk˜Dek˜χk˜(x
∗
k˜
, e∗
k˜
) = 0
which implies ∆µk = ∆µk˜ = 0 and ∆λk = ∆λk˜. Then, from system (25) we
get ∆λk = 0 and ∆p
\ = 0, since p∗C = 1. Once again, Proposition 3 implies
that ∆λh = ∆µh = 0 for each h ∈ H. Therefore, ∆ = 0.
Theorem 25 (Regular value theorem) Let M , N be Cr manifolds of dimen-
sions m and n, respectively. Let f : M −→ N be a Cr function. Assume
r > max{m− n, 0}. If y ∈ N is a regular value for f , then
(1) if m < n, f−1(y) = ∅,
(2) if m ≥ n, either f−1(y) = ∅, or f−1(y) is an (m − n)-dimensional sub-
manifold of M .
Corollary 26 Let M , N be Cr manifolds of the same dimension. Let f :
M −→ N be a Cr function. Assume r ≥ 1. Let y ∈ N a regular value for f
such that f−1(y) is non-empty and compact. Then, f−1(y) is a finite subset of
M .
The following results is a consequence of the Sard Theorem for manifolds. See,
for example Villanacci et al. (2002).
Theorem 27 Let M , Ω and N be Cr manifolds of dimensions m, p and n,
respectively. Let f : M × Ω −→ N be a Cr function. Assume r > max{m −
n, 0}. If y ∈ N is a regular value for f , then there exists a full measure subset
Ω∗ of Ω such that for any ω ∈ Ω∗, y ∈ N is a regular value for fω, where
fω : ξ ∈M −→ fω(ξ) := f(ξ, ω) ∈ N
Corollary 28 Let M , Ω and N be Cr manifolds of dimensions m, p and n,
respectively. Let f : M × Ω −→ N be a Cr function. Assume r > max{m −
31
n, 0}. Let Γ be a full measure subset of Ω such that for any ω ∈ Γ, y ∈ N is a
regular value for fω. If the projection piΩ : (ξ, ω) ∈ f−1(y) −→ piΩ(ξ, ω) := ω ∈
Ω is proper, then Γ is open in Ω.
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